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Federalism and Health Care Reform: Is
Half a Loaf Really Worse Than None?
By RicHARD

BRIFFAULT*

Health care reform dominates the domestic agenda of the Clinton
Administration. Policy analysts, media pundits, and ordinary citizens
are abuzz with the once-arcane terminology of health reform-"managed competition," "single-payer," "regional alliances," "global budgets"-as they ponder the merits and demerits of the leading reform
alternatives. At the center of the public debate are questions concerning the role of government in constraining health care costs, maintaining quality, and widening access. But in our federal system there are
two governments that can address most domestic problems-the national government and the states-and, although considerable ink has
been spilled over the issues of how large and what type of a regulatory
role government ought to play in health care, relatively little attention
has been devoted to the question of which government ought to do
the regulating, or how the two layers of government ought to interact
in the pursuit of reform. The general lack of concern over the federalism implications of a national initiative that would affect one-seventh
of the domestic economy and define national policies for areas traditionally left to states the is striking. Yet, given the propensity of policy
analysts to debate the substance of proposals while ignoring issues of
government structure, the inattention to federalism is, sadly, not

surprising.
Professor Candice Hoke's Article, "Constitutional Impediments
to National Health Reform: Tenth Amendment and Spending Clause
Hurdles,"' thus, makes a significant contribution to the evolving
health care reform debate. Her close review of the elements of the
leading health care reform alternatives that bear directly on the states,
and her careful assessment of these proposals in light of the law and
principles of federalism, provide both informed insight concerning an
* Professor of Law, Columbia University. J.D. 1977, Harvard; B.A. 1974, Columbia
University.
1. Candice Hoke, Constitutional Impediments to National Health Reform: Tenth
Amendment and Spending Clause Hurdles, 21 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 489 (1994).
[611]
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under-examined aspect of health care reform and a distinctive critical
perspective on the ramifications of health care reform for the balance
of power within the federal system. Her Article raises thoughtful
questions both about how federalism concerns ought to constrain the
design of national policy initiatives and of the potential of the
Supreme Court's recent New York v. United States2 decision to generate substantial constitutional limits on the federal government's ability
to secure the participation of the states in national programs.
This brief Commentary is not the place for a sustained examination of the various and changing health reform initiatives or the constitutionality of each of the health reform proposals that are the
subject of Professor Hoke's careful critique. Instead, I would like to
address two principal themes in Professor Hoke's article: (1) Her argument that reforms in which the federal government calls upon the
states to carry out national goals and secures state participation
through a combination of carrots and, especially, sticks, are by their
very nature harmful to the values of federalism, with the implication
that federalism would be better served by a health care system administered entirely by the federal government than by one that combats
federal and state roles; and (2) her elaboration of New York's principle that the federal government may not command state legislative or
regulatory action into a broader rule that would invalidate some federal measures short of commands that tend to induce states to join
federal programs.
These two themes are intertwined. The assumption, implicit in
her analysis, that federal-state programs, with Congress pressing the
states to participate, are worse, from a federalism perspective, than
outright federal takeover of a field drives the argument for reading
New York broadly. By the same token, her interpretation of New
York provides a constitutional underpinning for her opposition to programs that would enlist the states in the pursuit of national reform.
It is less clear to me than it is to Professor Hoke, however, that
the values of federalism are necessarily injured by regulatory structures that rely on state and local personnel, give the states some role
in implementation, and preserve a space for state policy-making, initiative, and accountability within the interstices of national standards.
The institutional interests of the states and the values that underlie
contemporary federalism could be advanced by a national program
addressing a problem that currently strains state budgets but is proba2. 112 S. Ct. 2408 (1992).
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bly beyond the capacity of the states to address without some federal
assistance. Moreover, a national program that creates the possibility
of some state discretion in implementation could promote the values
of federalism, even as new federal standards and pressures also constrain the states.
Nor is it clear that New York can or should be read as a one-way
ratchet, imposing ever-tighter limits on the ability of the federal government to impose pressures-short of commands-on the states to
participate in national programs. New York leaves intact a variety of
intergovernmental devices that, by their very nature, induce the states
to implement national programs, even in areas beyond the reach of
direct national regulation.3 These mechanisms facilitate the combination of federal and state roles which, in many settings, may be a better
way to promote the interests of both the nation and the states than
regulations that require the federal government or the states to act
apart from the other level of government. As New York itself indicates, federalism does not, and should not, bar joint federal-state
4
action.

As Professor Hoke points out, a striking feature of the principal
health care reform proposals currently before Congress is the avoidance of what she considers "the most obvious available structure: preempting State and local regulatory authority and substituting a
nationally funded and operated administrative agency dedicated to
achieving Congress' goals."5 From a constitutional perspective, the
avoidance of federal preemption and the creation of a new federal
health care bureaucracy is particularly remarkable because "[s]uch an
approach would be initiated by a constitutionally unexceptional use of
the commerce power."6 Instead, all the major health care proposals
give the states a significant role in administering new national policies
and in implementing the national programs.7
3. See, e.g., South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987); Oklahoma v. Civil Serv.
Comm'n, 330 U.S. 127 (1947).
4. New York v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 2408 (1992).
5. Hoke, supra note 1, at 500.
6. Id.
7. Since Professor Hoke wrote her article, Representative Pete Stark (D. Cal.), the
chair of the Subcommittee on Health of the Ways and Means Committee of the United
States House of Representatives, has proposed a health care reform that would provide
insurance for the currently uninsured through expansion of the federal Medicare program.
This could be a wholly federal solution to the lack of insurance problem, although it is less
clear how expansion of Medicare would address the medical cost problem for individuals
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One would think that this would be cause for "federalist" celebration: no new federal bureaucracy, no sweeping federal displacement of state laws and structures, new and expanded regulatory roles
for state personnel, continued state involvement in at least some important health care issues. Symbolically, the commitment of most federal reformers to a central role for the states in the implementation of
health care initiatives reflects and reaffirms most Americans' deep
suspicion of the federal government, as well as the ingrained political
and cultural preference, even among federal officials, for state and
local-as opposed to federal-action. Federalism, defined as the
commitment to decentralized decisionmaking, the avoidance of the
concentration of power in the national government, and the provision
of a role for the states in areas of domestic policy that directly affect
the daily lives of ordinary people, is surely honored when all the federal parties involved in the most important effort in decades to significantly expand the domestic role of government assume that a major
part of the expanded government role will be played by the states.
Indeed, one can only imagine the howls of opposition from federalism's exponents had health reformers proposed to dispense totally
with any state role in the national health care system and to create a
new federal bureaucracy to administer a program for the regulation of
insurers, health care providers, and health care costs.
A national health care reform that combines federal and state
roles would be of more benefit to the states as institutions and to the
values that underlie federalism than would a purely federal program.
Depending on just how much discretion is left to the states in a particular health reform plan, a combined federal-state reform could give
the states some role in determining the scope of health care coverage,
the schedule of payments to providers, the mechanisms for cost containment, and the extent of choice in the selection of physicians and
treatment. Again, depending on exactly how much interstate variation is allowed, a state might also be able to tailor particular reforms,
such as the adoption of alternative dispute resolution in cases involving health care providers, to its particular needs, conditions, or traditions. In other words, the states might enjoy some powers to continue
to make policy in areas that have traditionally been within the purview of state authority.
Moreover, vesting some responsibility for the provision of insurance coverage, the assurance of quality, and the containment of costs
and employers relying on private health insurance. See Robert Pear, New Health Plan
Stresses Medicare, N.Y. TiMES, Mar. 1, 1994, at A10.
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at the state or sub-state' level may actually make it more likely that
these goals will be attained. The actions needed to achieve the many
ends of health care reform are likely to vary significantly from place to
place within the United States. It is doubtful whether a single national
bureaucracy would be able to design its rules and requirements to
take interstate and intrastate variation fully into account. Delegating
responsibility to state and sub-state units increases the possibilities
that policies will match local conditions, whether because of differences in the rules of the various jurisdictions or because state and local officials, accountable to state and local politicians and to state and
local electorates, will tailor administration of national rules to state
and local conditions. Further, such decentralized implementation is
likely to improve the monitoring of local outcomes and the revision of
policies in light of their real-world effects in differing state and local
settings.
Finally, placing responsibility for the implementation of health
reform in the hands of sub-national institutions is likely to enhance
the possibilities for ordinary people to observe conditions, raise questions, comments, and complaints, and seek changes in the way reform
is carried out. A variety of local administrative mechanisms are likely
to be more transparent, more open to observation and participation
by ordinary people, than a single national one. Moreover, it will probably be easier for people to organize, seek change, and hold public
officials accountable with respect to the performance of a program if
some responsibility for that program is borne at the state or local
level. Increasing opportunities for individual participation in public
decisionmaking and enhancing the ability of ordinary people to get
government to respond to their concerns is a central value of contemporary advocates of federalism. 9
To be sure, the amount of power that state officials will actually
have to tailor national programs to local conditions, and the opportunities that local people will really have to influence decisions, is uncertain. Much will turn on the specific provisions, rather than the broad
contours, of the reform proposals ultimately adopted. It may be that
the states will be given relatively little space to develop local solutions
or to adapt national standards to local settings. It may be that federal
requirements will leave the states with relatively little room to maneu8.
ances,"
Health
9.

Under the Clinton health plan, many key decisions will be made by "regional allicreated by the states, with jurisdictions that will often be less than an entire state.
Security Act, S. 1757, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. §1311 (1993).
See Hoke, supra note 1, at 547.
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ver, that federal rules will operate as ceilings as well as floors. It may
be that the substantive federalism benefits in terms of opportunities
for local input, experimentation, citizen participation, and policy variation in light of differing local conditions or regulatory preferences
will be relatively small. God is in the details, and the details of
whatever reform is ultimately adopted could render the federalism
benefits of state administration and implementation trivial.
Nevertheless, reliance on the states for implementation and administration of any national health care reform at least increases the
possibility of some substantive state role and some opportunities for
ordinary people to influence local health care decisions through grassroots political activity. Moreover, state or sub-state administration
avoids the expansion of the federal bureaucracy and the creation of a
regulatory mechanism which would greatly increase the power of federal officials over the day-to-day lives of ordinary people. Given these
factors, how can it be that the combined federal-state programs outlined in the major reform initiatives, including President Clinton's
plan, are necessarily worse for the states than no role at all? Is it
really the case that for federalism half a loaf-or even a scattering of
crumbs-is worse than none?
Although Professor Hoke's Article is primarily critical and she
does not propose her own structure for national health reform, her
analysis implies that an all-federal reform would be better for federalism and for the states than the proposals currently before Congress
that would combine federal policy-making and requirements with
state responsibility for administration and implementation. She contends that the purpose and effect of the health care proposals is to
force the states to bear the fiscal and political costs of reform. President Clinton and the Congressional health care reformers provide for
a large administrative role for the states, she contends, not out of any
solicitude for federalism and not to enhance the capacity of the states
to structure reform in light of varying local conditions and preferences, but simply because "the Federal government is strapped for
cash."'" By enticing the states "to ante up funds they currently employ for health administration or health services" and by "implicitly
conscripting a portion of the States' personnel and budgets," the federal proposals "eliminate or severely restrict the politically unpalatable alternative of raising Federal taxes."'"
10. Hoke, supra note 1, at 500.
11. Id. at 500-01.
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She argues that, not only does state implementation of health reform get the President and Congress out of a tight political and fiscal
spot, it is also fraught with danger for the states. "[T]he kinds of incursions into the State fisc and policy-making apparatus that pervade
the pending health reform bills" amount to a federal "pilfer[ing of] the
State's coffers for its own projects" that leave "the cupboard bare for
the projects and self-determined needs." Moreover, "[b]oth the States
and their officials would bear the brunt of popular concern over raised
taxes or slashed services caused by national orders." As a result,
"[t]he States' personnel, fise, and control over their political agendas
would be greatly impeded."' 2 In short, states would no longer be able
to pursue their own policies and programs because their revenues
would have been conscripted into the national effort. State officials
would be blamed, and state governments unfairly discredited, for the
inability of the states to pursue local projects and objectives. This
would harm the states as institutions and, ultimately, threaten "political participation and its roles in constructing individuals' commitment
to their government" because if the nation becomes "the only political
entity with real power to set goals and values.., the range of persons
engaged in direct participation ... will likely fall substantially."' 3

Professor Hoke may be correct in suggesting that the motivation
for enacting a state role is the political self-interest of federal officials
rather than a commitment to the ideal of federalism, but that is not
much of an objection if, nevertheless, the states realize some benefit
from a combined federal-state reform, and the values of federalism
are served thereby. Thus, the core of her concern must be that the
states will be made worse off by national reform because, in the guise
of giving the states a place in the implementation of any reform, the
federal government will be draining the states of treasure, personnel,
and energy. In reaching this conclusion, however, Professor Hoke
fails to consider two factors critical to the evaluation of the impact of
health care reform on the states: first, the massive health care burdens
the states currently bear; and, second, the lack of fiscally and politically viable alternatives to combined federal-state reform.
Central to Professor Hoke's argument is the concern that reform
would compel the states to devote their scarce tax dollars to what is
essentially a federal program. But the states' treasuries are already
funding a significant portion of the nation's health care expenditures,
much as health care costs are currently devouring state revenues. Ac12. Id. at 549.
13. Id.
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much as health care costs are currently devouring state revenues. According to the Congressional Budget Office, in 1990, state and local
governments spent more than one hundred billion dollars of their own
funds on health care-or roughly 13% of the total national health care
bill. 4 That number is expected to soar to $244 billion by the year
2000.1- Medicaid alone constitutes the second largest budget line for
the states, after elementary and secondary education. 6 Total health
care expenditures accounted for 17% of state and local governments'
own-source revenues in 1990, with that figure projected to rise to over
27% by the year 2000.17 As these numbers suggest, without significant
reform, health care is likely to account for a substantial share of the
real dollar increase in state and local budgets between now and the
end of the decade. In short, state budgets are already groaning under
the weight of heavy, and increasing, health care costs, and the fiscal
burdens of health care are already driving and constraining state policy-making. The ability of the people of the states to use their state
governments to develop new programs and pursue new agendas, or
even to cut back on taxes and reduce the size of their state budgets, is
currently severely restricted by health care costs.
The Clinton Administration estimates that its health reform plan
will save the states $46 billion, or 8% of what they would otherwise
spend on health care over the next five years."'" While this estimate
must be taken with a considerable dose of salt,' 9 some of the proposals for shared federal-state health reform could save the states substantial sums. It is certainly possible that health reform will save the
states more in reduced Medicaid and long-term care expenditures
than it will cost them in terms of the administrative expenses of implementing federal health reform. And this cost accounting considers
only the fiscal implications for the institutional interests of the states.
Many of the states have been grappling for years with efforts to provide health care for their uninsured residents who are not eligible for
Medicare or Medicaid, but few have had the funds to do so. Many of
14.

CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS OF RISING HEALTH

CARE COSTS 7 (Table 1) (1992).

15. Id. at 24 (Table 1).
16. Deborah A. Stone, Why the States Can'tSolve the Health Care Crisis,9 TE AMERICAN PROSPECT 53, 55 (Spring 1992).
17. CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, PROJECTIONS OF NATIONAL HEALTH EXPENDITURES 8 (1992).
18. Robert Pear, Administration Outlines Hopes for Health Savings, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
2, 1994, at B7.
19. See id. (noting New York officials' assertion that Clinton figures significantly overstate the likely benefits to New York).

Spring 1994]

FEDERALISM AND HEALTH CARE REFORM

619

the federal-state health reform proposals would provide broad coverage funded by billions of new federal dollars, whether from formally
denominated federal "taxes" or euphemistically labelled "employer
mandates."
There is, thus, at least some possibility that, in terms of reducing
the burden on state treasuries and enhancing the ability of the states
to advance the welfare of their residents, combined federal-state
health reform-even reform that places new administrative burdens
on the states-will benefit the states. Although the states may be subject to nominal new administrative and fiscal burdens, health reform
might actually give them greater freedom to set their own political and
fiscal agendas and to secure their own ends.
Moreover, under present conditions it appears that a combined
federal-state structure is more likely to secure the cost-containing,
coverage-extending benefits of reform for the states and their residents than either of the two alternative routes within the federal system: states-only reform or federal-only reform. Significant states-only
reform is unlikely due to the structural constraints of interstate competition, the limited fiscal resources of many states, and the restrictions on state action resulting from the existing and unchallenged
federal interests in the field. Any health care reform aimed at controlling costs and financing insurance coverage for the uninsured is likely
to involve new taxes and regulatory burdens on health care providers,
insurers, and employers.2" A general problem that states encounter
when they seek to impose new taxes and regulatory burdens is the
threat of mobile businesses subject to regulation or taxation to flee the
jurisdiction to other less-regulatory or lower-tax states. With states
dependent on businesses to provide jobs and on the tax base for state
revenues, businesses' ability to exit to another state limits the capacity
20. I do not mean to overstate the case against the likelihood of state-based health
care reform. Indeed, "historically the states have taken the lead in health care reform."
Deborah L. Rogel & W. David Helms, Tracking States' Efforts to Reform Health Systems,
HEALTH AFF., Summer 1993, at 27. States have traditionally played the major role in the
regulation of insurance, much as they have also been significantly involved in the oversight
of health care delivery. In just the last few years, more than a dozen states have taken a
variety of actions that fall under the rubric of health care reform, including revision of
insurance underwriting practices, "broadening access to medical care and moderating the
growth of future spending on personal health services." John K. Inglehart, From the Editor, HEALTH AFF., Summer 1993, at 6 (preface to issue focussing on "state models" for
health reform, including detailed evaluations of reforms in Florida, Hawaii, Maryland,
Minnesota, New Jersey, Oregon, Vermont, and Washington, and brief references to reform
efforts in another seven states). My point is merely that, due to the factors I discuss in the
text, national policy goals of assuring universal access to insurance and containing rising
health care costs are unlikely to be attained by states-only reform.
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of any individual state to take action. As the Supreme Court observed
nearly sixty years ago in discussing why during the Great Depression
most states had failed to adopt their own unemployment compensation laws funded by business taxation, prior to the enactment of a federal scheme, "Many held back through alarm, lest in laying such a toll
upon their industries, they would place themselves in a position of
economic disadvantage as compared with neighbors or competitors."'" As the Court recognized, some federal action is necessary to
deal with the prisoners' dilemma of competitive interstate
federalism. 22
The fear of insurer, provider, or employer exit in the face of costcontainment requirements or new taxation may significantly constrain
individual states from enacting the regulatory programs they might
otherwise prefer, or imposing the taxes necessary to fund the programs they might use to provide coverage for the uninsured. From
this perspective then, federal legislation that formally burdens the
states may actually allow states to reduce their costs and secure the
well-being of their residents, because federal standards and requirements would eliminate the fear that other states, not adopting new
taxes or regulation would benefit from the flight of firms and taxpayers from the more regulatory and higher-taxing states.
More generally, "state fiscal realities limit the potential subsidies"' that states can provide to insurers, employers, or individuals to
assure that everyone has health care coverage. Universal health insurance will require billions of new dollars-dollars that the states are
simply unable to provide. By contrast, President Clinton's plan, even
though it may require the states to incur new administrative costs,
provides for tens of billions of dollars per year for health care in new
federal taxes, and hundreds of billions of dollars from its fiscal centerpiece, the employer mandate.2 4
21. Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 588 (1937).
22. On federalism and the prisoners' dilemma, see SusAN RosE-AcKERMAN, RETHINKING THE PROGRESSIVE AGENDA: THE REFORM OF THE AMERICAN REGULATORY

STATE 166-70 (1992). As Deborah Stone has pointed out, "the corollary of the exit threat
in a federal system is the 'magnet fear.' States fear that by offering more generous benefits
to the poor than neighboring states they will actually induce more poor people to move
into the state." Stone, supra note 16, at 59. She suggests that in one instance a more generous Indiana plan encouraged the emigration of some poor from Illinois. Id. Whatever the
extent in fact of more generous benefits serving as a "magnet," certainly the fear of a
magnet effect along with the fear of exit constrain states' willingness to provide new, costly
health care benefits.
23. Stone, supra note 16, at 54.
24. According to the Congressional Budget Office, in fiscal 1999, the first year in
which the President's plan is fully phased in, the federal government would provide $29
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Finally, the states cannot go it alone because of existing federal
legislation and federal interests in health care and insurance. The federal Medicare program covers the cost of health care for 33 million
older Americans. Medicare is a wholly federal program, and it pays
for 40% of all hospital costs. 25 The ability of the states to control hospital costs is inevitably limited when, in Deborah Stone's phrase, "the
lion's share of the costs is controlled by a lion outside their jurisdiction."26 Similarly, the Federal Employee Retirement Income Security
Act (ERISA) restricts the scope of state action because ERISA
broadly preempts state regulation of employee benefit plans.
Although the states may continue to regulate insurers, the federal
courts have interpreted ERISA as precluding the states from regulating self-insuring employers. When ERISA was enacted in 1974, selfinsured employer plans covered only 5% of the people with employee
health insurance; two decades later they cover over 50%.27 With ERISA preemption, "[s]tates cannot require employers to provide insurance or mandate the terms of employee benefits that self-insuring
employers provide. States are also prohibited from taxing self-insuring employers to finance care for the uninsured."' By placing a large
percentage of employers and insured health care consumers out of the
reach of state regulation and taxation, ERISA severely constrains the
ability of states to determine the scope of health care benefits, pool
insureds so as to hold down insurance costs, or raise the revenues necessary to extend coverage to the uninsured.29
billion per year in new federal tax dollars for health coverage.

CONGRESSIONAL BUDrET
OFFICE, AN ANALYSIS OF THE ADMINISTRATION'S HEALTH PROPOSAL 29 (Table 2-2)

(1994). More importantly, the administration's employer mandate would be the source of
an additional $290 billion. Id. at 38 (Table 2-5). Although some of the funds raised by the
employer mandate would replace existing employer payments for health insurance, much
of the money would be in addition to the dollars currently available for health care coverage. The administration does not characterize the employer mandate as a new federal tax,
but, in the words of the CBO Study, the mandate "represents an exercise of the sovereign
federal power" and the moneys raised pursuant to it "should be shown as governmental
receipts." Id. at xv. Whether or not the mandate is a "tax," it is surely an important new
source of funds that significantly complements state efforts.
25. Wendy E. Parmet, Regulation and Federalism:Legal Impediments to State Health
CareReform, 19 AM. J.L. & MED. 121, 130-31 (1993).
26. Stone, supra note 16, at 55.
27. Id. at 57.
28. Parmet, supra note 25, at 134.
29. On the effects of ERISA preemption on the ability of states to initiate health care
reforms, see generally Parmet, supra note 25, at 132-140; Stone, supra note 16, at 57-58;
Fernando R. Laguarda, Note, FederalismMyth: States as Laboratoriesof Health Care Reform, 82 GEo. L.J. 159, 174-75 (1993). Other federal programs that limit state health care
reform efforts include Medicaid and the Americans with Disabilities Act. See Parmet,
supra note 25, at 131-32, 140-43; Laguarda, supra, at 176-79.
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Although Medicare, ERISA, and other federal statutes, including
Medicaid and the Americans With Disabilities Act, constrain state initiatives and can be condemned for their interference with the states'
capacity to address health care problems on their own,30 these statutes
do reflect some traditional federal concerns and policies: redistribution for the benefit of the elderly and the poor, protection of victims
of discrimination, and national regulation of employer-employee relations for firms in interstate commerce. Even without these statutes,
states-only regulations could raise concerns about the adequacy of different levels of support for health care fGr the poor in different states,
or the impact of differing state regulations on interstate commerce.31
In any event, these statutes do exist, and Professor Hoke has not suggested that they raise federalism problems in terms of the "commandeering" of the states' governments into national programs which is
the focus of her concern. Some significant federal component would
be necessary in health care reform if only to coordinate the existing
federal programs and statutes.3
To be sure, Professor Hoke has not criticized proposals for a federal role in health reform; what has drawn her fire is the combination
of federal policy-making and state administration. The inference that
I draw from her criticism of proposals that assume that the states
would play a significant role in the implementation of a new national
program is that she would prefer an all-federal structure for reform.
An all-federal reform could, in theory, secure uniform national coverage and cost containment without commandeering the personnel or
treasury of the states. However, it is not clear "on the merits"-that
is, in terms of assuring high quality, cost-effective health care for all
Americans-that an all-federal system is the best structure of reform.
As previously suggested, utilization practices, health care costs, and
background conditions affecting health vary significantly from place
to place across the continent. Some aspects of health care administration, such as the interaction of patients with doctors, clinics, or community hospitals, are intensely local, with few extra-local, let alone
interstate, ramifications. Additionally, many smaller offices might be
better at monitoring local outcomes than a single national bureaucracy. Even Canada's highly-touted single-payer system is in effect a
collection of provincial systems, with considerable interprovincial variation in costs and coverage, and provincial responsibility for admin30. See, e.g., Laguarda, supra note 29.
31. See generally Parmet, supra note 25.
32. See Stone, supra note 16, at 53.
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istration-and Canada has only one-tenth the population of the
United States.
More importantly, health care quality aside, Professor Hoke has
pointed to the principal practical obstacle to an all-federal system: the
federal budget deficit and the intense unwillingness of federal elected
officials to raise federal taxes. Few federal officeholders are willing to
utter the "t-word" in the context of health reform. President Clinton
has sought to treat most of the health reform financing as an offbudget item, with the hundreds of billions of dollars to be raised under
the federal "employer mandate" not considered a tax at all. The other
principal reform proposals also look to some combination of tax expenditures, limitations on current tax deductibility, and employer
mandates. In the current political and fiscal climate, a fully federally
funded and administered system seems unlikely, whatever its substantive wisdom.
Thus, some form of health care reform is likely to be better for
the states than no reform at all, and a combined federal-state program, with the states pressed to bear some of the administrative expenses of expanding coverage and containing costs, may be the most
realistic-even if not necessarily the most desirable-route to reform.
The states might be better off with a cost-free health reform than with
a reform program that saddles them with new administrative burdens,
but with the states currently straining under the weight of high and
rising health care costs, and yet in most cases unable to assure adequate health coverage to all residents, it is far from clear that a combined federal-state program, even one imposing some new costs on
the states, is so detrimental to the interests of state governments or to
the ability of state residents to use their states as institutions of selfgovernment. Under these circumstances, health reform achieved
through combining federal standards, pressures, and funds with some
state administration and implementation ought not to be ruled out on
federalism grounds. If a combined federal-state program gave the
states some discretion to tailor various rules and policies to local conditions and preferences, then surely such a program would advance
both the cost-containing and coverage issues at stake in health reform,
as well as the values of federalism.
To be sure, the states, or some states, might benefit relatively little from whatever reform is ultimately adopted, yet find themselves
saddled with considerable new costs. And certainly, as health reform
wends its way through Congress, programs initially enacted will be
subsequently amended. And as federal appropriations in the "out-
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years" shape the relative burdens borne by the federal government
and the states over time, health reform could turn out to be a very bad
deal for the states, or at least for some of them. The states will have to
struggle vigorously and vigilantly to defend their interests in the national political process and in conflicts with insurer, provider, and consumer interest groups."3 National health care reform could turn out to
be a bad deal for the states, and the question of the federalism impact
of a reform that relies on the states' assumption of an important administrative role might have to be reopened. But given the states'
current health care burdens and the practical difficulties that beset the
other alternatives to reform it is difficult to accept the premise, at this
early stage in the health reform process, that national health reform
which relies on the states for administration and implementation necessarily violates the values of federalism.

II
As Professor Hoke has indicated, whatever the policy-based assessment of the federalism implications of a national health care reform, the constitutionality of such action is another question, the
answer to which is significantly affected by the Supreme Court's re-

cent decision in New York v. United States. 4 In New York, the Court
held that "Congress may not simply 'commandeer[ ] the legislative
processes of the states by directly compelling them to enact and en-

force a federal regulatory program."' 3 5 Even when the subject matter
of the federal statute falls within the scope of federal power so that
Congress has the authority to pass laws requiring or prohibiting certain acts of private individuals, Congress "lacks the power directly to
compel the states to require or prohibit those acts." 6 Congress may
regulate interstate commerce, but it lacks authority "to regulate state
governments' regulation of interstate commerce."3 7
New York represents the Court's latest effort to write a constitutional law for federalism." As Professor Hoke points out, New York
33. States and local governments have enjoyed some successes in protecting their interests in the federal political process. See, e.g., Carol F. Lee, The PoliticalSafeguards of
Federalism? CongressionalResponses to Supreme Court Decisions on State and Local Liability, 20 UR. L. 301 (1988).
34. 112 S. Ct. 2408 (1992).
35. Id. at 2420 (quoting Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452
U.S. 264, 288 (1981)).
36. Id. at 2423.
37. Id.
38. See generally H. Jefferson Powell, The Oldest Question of ConstitutionalLaw, 79
VA. L. Rnv. 633 (1993).

Spring 19941

FEDERALISM AND HEALTH CARE REFORM

calls into serious question "untethered regulatory commands." 3 9 But

New York's anti-"commandeering" principle does not stand alone,
and it does not prohibit all federal actions that place fiscal, political,
and regulatory pressures on the states. Rather, New York is situated
in a body of case law and intergovernmental practices that allow Congress to use joint federal-state programs to promote the general welfare, and employ a variety of techniques, in addition to the gift of
condition-free funds, to induce the states to participate in such

programs.
First, New York followed the holding in Garcia v. San Antonio
Metropolitan Transit Authority4° in assuming that the Constitution
does not reserve to the states those subjects that were traditionally

matters of state competence. Indeed,the New York Court noted that
the Commerce and Spending Clauses together give the federal government broad power to act with respect to activities "once considered purely local."'" Second, New York did not disturb Garcia's
ruling that Congress may "subject state governments to generally applicable laws," 42 such as those that regulate the employment relationship, even though those laws impose substantial costs on the states,
and, consequently, may constrain the states' freedom to adopt new
programs. Finally, the Court confirmed that although Congress may
not order the states to adopt certain laws or carry out federal laws,

Congress may deploy a range of tools "to encourage a State to regulate in a particular way" and "hold out incentives to the states as a
method of influencing a State's policy choices." 43
39. See Hoke, supra note 1, at 552-55. I am also inclined to agree with Professor
Hoke's argument that New York also calls into question federal statutes requiring states to
choose between submitting to federal directives or paying a "fee" that clearly raises more
revenue than necessary to fund the program. Id. at 558-62 (discussing conditional preemption plus state fee). Although the federal government may charge the states as well as the
private sector for services the federal government provides, see, e.g., Massachusetts v.
United States, 435 U.S. 444, 460-63 (1978), the charge must not discriminate against the
states relative to private payers. Moreover, a charge well in excess of the cost of a service
is either redistributive or punitive and is, thus, a tax. Arguably, a charge for a service that
the state must accept should also be considered a tax. On the other hand, it could also be
argued that the state may be forced to accept the service if its failure to do so imposes costs
on other states. If a state's only choices are to carry out a federal directive or pay a tax,
that is closely equivalent to the choice between two commands which the Supreme Court
ruled out in New York.
40. 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
41. New York, 112 S.Ct. at 2419.
42. Id. at 2420.
43. Id. at 2423.
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The Court specifically confirmed the continued constitutionality
of two federal devices for influencing state policy-making: conditional
spending and conditional preemption. With respect to the power to
attach strings to federal grants, the Court acknowledged that "the conditions attached to the funds by Congress may influence a State's legislative choices." 44 Indeed, in this era of constrained state budgets,
that influence is likely to be quite powerful. 45 Yet New York cited
approvingly the Court's earlier decision in South Dakota v. Dole,
which "found no constitutional flaw" in a federal statute directing the
withholding of federal highway funds from any state that failed to
adopt "Congress' choice of a minimum drinking age." 47 Dole is a particularly powerful example of the authority of Congress to "influence"
the legislative agenda of the states because, due to the Twenty-first
Amendment, the drinking age is arguably the rare subject reserved to
the states exclusively and beyond the scope of Congress' Commerce
Clause authority. Nonetheless, the Court found that Congress' use of
federal funds "to encourage uniformity in the States' drinking ages"
was "within constitutional bounds even if Congress may not regulate
drinking ages directly. ' 48 Similarly, New York cited with approval Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Association,49 and Fed5 0 two decisions in
eral Energy Regulatory Commission v. Mississippi,
which the Court had sustained federal statutes which threatened to
preempt state law-making from traditional state fields-land use regulation and public utility regulation-unless the states agreed to regulate the activity in question according to federal standards. 51 Despite
the pressure inherent in the threat to preempt the states from acting in
areas of longstanding state concern, conditional preemption, like conditional spending, leaves to "the residents of the State... the ultimate
decision as to whether or not the State will comply""2 with the federal
policy at issue, and, thus, does not violate the anti-"commandeering"
principle.

44. Id.
45. See generally Lewis B. Kaden, Politics,Money and State Sovereignty: The Judicial
Role, 79 COLUM. L. REv. 847, 874-81 (1979).
46. 483 U.S. 203 (1987).
47. New York, 112 S. Ct. at 2423.
48. Dole, 483 U.S. at 206.
49. 452 U.S. 264 (1981).
50. 456 U.S. 742 (1982).
51. New York, 112 S. Ct. at 2424 (citing Hodel, 452 U.S. at 288, and FERC,456 U.S. at
764-65.
52. New York, 112 S. Ct. at 2424.
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When placed in the context of these other federalism decisions,
New York's anti-"commandeering" principle is of indeterminate
scope. New York may be read either as simply precluding formal orders, or, more expansively, as a general principle barring the federal
government from placing pressures on the states to participate in federal programs. If New York's anti-"commandeering" principle is read
narrowly and limited to direct commands, its doctrine could be reduced to a mere formality, a matter of lese itat protecting the dignity
of the states but not providing a substantial immunity from federal
policy-making. For federal legislators, New York would become simply a drafting nuisance, entailing the careful avoidance of Professor
Hoke's "untethered regulatory commands" but permitting a variety of
other mechanisms that would make non-compliance with federal policy painful for the states. On the other hand, if the anti-"commandeering" principle is read broadly to prohibit federal actions that
nominally let the states go their own way but actually place "undue
influence" or excessive pressure on the states, then New York will
qiickly come into conflict with the case law sustaining conditional
spending and conditional preemption, and could become a real obstacle to the joint federal-state pursuit of national ends.
Professor Hoke would read New York broadly to reach many
forms of indirect pressure as well as direct commands to the states.
Several of her models of "problematic commands to state governments" do not involve commands to state governments at all, but "extraordinary inducements" in the form of either strings attached to
Federal grants or burdens to be placed on private actors within states
that have chosen not to participate in federal programs.5 3 In her view,
"the strategic use of federal grant programs threatens the constitutional role of states; the grants may be employed to reduce or eliminate the independence of and regulatory experimentation by State
governments." 54 So, too, permitting Congress to place burdens on the
private sector in states that have opted out of federal programs would
the back door what it is barred
enable Congress to "achieve through
55
from doing through the front.Surely Professor Hoke is correct in assuming that the threat to
withhold large sums of federal aid constitutes an "extraordinary inducement" to state action to satisfy the federal terms, much as the
53. Hoke, supra note 1, at 562-573. (These are Professor Hoke's models five, six, and
seven).
54. Hoke, supra note 1, at 572.
55. Id. at 565.
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private sector penalties, could generate powerful intrastate political
pressures on state governments to act. Yet New York, by its own
terms and when read in the context of the Supreme Court's other federalism decisions, does not limit federal power to attach strings to
spending, does not restrict federal power to regulate private actors,
and does not proscribe all federal efforts to influence state legislative
decisions. The inducements that result from strings attached to spending were specifically validated in New York.5 6 In older cases the Court
sustained federal legislation imposing taxes on the private sector in
states that had failed to adopt measures consistent with federal policy, 57 even in the face of arguments and evidence that the federal tax
was passed primarily "to coerce the states" into adopting those measures. 8 New York is not unidirectional, rendering invalid all federal
efforts to press the states to adopt particular policies. Instead, New
York and the other relevant case law point in conflicting directions, as
the Supreme Court attempts to reconcile the overarching power of the
federal government to set national policies in now-virtually unlimited
areas of national concern and to influence state decisionmaking accordingly, with respect for the autonomy of the states. New York limits the federal government, but that limit is not itself unlimited; it must
be reconciled with other decisions validating federal authority.
Professor Hoke's extension of New York beyond "untethered
commands" to federal actions that do not involve direct commands to
the states is plainly less a matter of interpreting the holding in New
York or of attempting to harmonize the anti-"commandeering" principle with the Court's other federalism decisions than an articulation of
her vision of federalism and her concern that federalism is threatened
by joint federal-state programs. Professor Hoke's central focus is "republican process values,"5 9 defined in terms of citizen participation in
public affairs and the protection of communities with "particular sets
of values" and "'ends different in some respects from other communities'."6 In her view, federalism is a "basic commitment to actualizing
republican process values."6 1 Republican process values require autonomous states in which citizens may participate and feel that their
participation matters as to policy ends and means chosen. Federalism
is, thus, advanced by constitutional rules that protect state autonomy.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

New York, 112 S. Ct. at 2423.
See, e.g., Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548 (1937).
Florida v. Mellon, 273 U.S. 12, 15 (1927).
See Hoke, supra note 1, at 547.
Id.
Id.
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Professor Hoke finds state autonomy threatened by joint federalstate programs which press the states into the service of national policies. Although she would permit Congress to treat "the States as potential partners to be enticed into a joint effort,"'62 she finds some
federal "incentives," such as the denial of subsidies or the imposition
of taxes or restrictions on the private sector in uncooperative states,
"more akin to a shotgun wedding."63 Professor Hoke would save federal-state joint programs by permitting the "cooperative" ones while
invalidating the "shotgun weddings," but her expansive reading of
New York, and her propensity for finding coercion where others might
see the permissible pressures inherent in conditional spending, could
render many joint programs unconstitutional-a result which would
not serve the state autonomy interests vindicated by federalism.
The elusive distinction between forbidden commands and permissible persuasion will often be difficult to draw, as evidenced by the
longstanding difficulties courts and lawyers have faced in attempting
to distinguish between voluntary agreement and coerced consent in a
wide range of legal arenas. A court or commentator particularly concerned about the potential for federal actions to shape the political
setting for state decisions may be quick to see the "coercive" aspects
of federal incentives and, especially, the "undue" pressure immanent
in federal threats to withhold incentives, while another court might
see appropriate efforts by the federal government to assure that the
dollars paid by federal taxpayers are put to the goals adopted by those
taxpayers' representatives. 64
Moreover, a finding that federal inducements amount to coercion
may reflect certain assumptions about the normative legitimacy of the
baseline "uncoerced" activity. From one perspective, federal regulations that penalize private parties in a state that does not participate in
a federal program may generate "undue" intrastate political pressure
to join the federal program. But if the unregulated program is seen as
imposing costs on out-of-state residents, if the absence of a tax in one
state allows that state's residents to free ride on the efforts of residents of another state, or if the lack of a tax in one state undermines
the ability of other states to collect and enforce their taxes, then from
another perspective the unregulated situation is arguably a coercion of
out-of-staters which the states, acting through their federal representatives, may seek to cure.
62. Id. at 542.

63. Id.
64. See, e.g., Oklahoma v. United States Civil Serv. Comm'n, 330 U.S. 127,143 (1941).
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Reading New York's anti-"commandeering" principle expansively with an eye toward finding coercion in many ambiguous situations could constitute a serious threat to joint federal-state programs.
If the threat to withdraw funds for failure to comply with the conditions attached to federal grants were treated as coercive, how willing
would the federal government be to offer the states funds? If the
threat to preempt state regulation of a field where the states did not
regulate in a manner consistent with federal policies were treated as
coercive, would the federal government be able to adopt programs
that combine national standards with state discretion to take local circumstances into account? If the federal government could not tax private activity to level the interstate playing field between states
imposing a certain tax to fund a social safety net program and those
that do not, would the states be able or willing to run programs like
the unemployment compensation scheme sustained in Steward
Machine Co. v. Davis?65
A broad reading of New York, thus, threatens to inhibit the creation of joint federal-state programs. That will not advance the "republican process values" Professor Hoke finds vindicated by federalism.
To be sure, joint programs make it more difficult for the people to
determine which government to hold accountable for a particular program and they allow the federal government to shape state agendas.
But the problem of assessing government accountability, that is, of
determining which government actors and institutions are responsible
for the successes or failures of particular programs may be endemic to
any system like federalism in which political power is fragmented
among a number of actors and institutions.
Moreover, as I suggested in Part I, joint programs can also be a
source of autonomy for the states by providing an alternative to
states-only and all-federal regulation in areas of shared federal and
state interest. State autonomy is inherently restricted by the differences in state resources and the effects of interstate economic competition. Those states with more resources or states otherwise less
vulnerable to interstate competition will be able to adopt more aggressive regulatory programs or more generous social services systems.66 The other states may lack the taxable resources or may be so
"paralyzed by fear" of the loss of taxpayers or businesses that they
65. 301 U.S. 548 (1937).
66. This may explain why the only state to provide for universal health insurance is
Hawaii-its nearest state competitors are more than two thousand miles away.
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will be unable to pursue the programs their residents prefer.67 The
specter of interstate competition shapes the internal politics of many
states, enhancing the position of the most mobile firms and taxpayers
who can credibly threaten to exit to other states should the state legislature adopt the regulatory program or the tax to fund it that a majority of the residents of the state might support. Federal programs can
increase the autonomy of poorer states and the power of nonmobile
people relative to more mobile firms. Thus active, participatory, locally-accountable state governments may benefit from federal restrictions on other state governments. As the Supreme Court recognized,
by curtailing the power of the firms that threaten to exit and by lifting
the shackles of interstate competition from a state's internal decisionmaking, federal statutes that press or induce all states to adopt a certain tax or participate in a joint federal-state program may "not [be]
constraints, but the creation of a larger freedom."6
Nor will all-federal programs necessarily be better for the states
than joint federal-state programs marked by some federal pressure to
participate. Although all-federal programs can allow the states to
avoid the costs of administering federal programs, they also eliminate
the possibility that the states can have a role in tailoring the programs
to local needs, preferences, or conditions, or that locally accountable
officials will be responsible for their implementation. "[R]epublican
process values" are virtually by definition better served by administrative structures that are more attentive to intrastate diversity and that
provide greater opportunities for grass-roots oversight and participation than by programs that consist of federal bureaucrats imposing
uniform nationwide standards.
Professor Hoke is concerned that federal-state programs will divert state money, personnel, and energy to federal goals so that the
states will eventually be unable to pursue their own ends. She suggests that the states might be better served by total federal takeover of
a field, than by federal legislation that relies on the states for administration, since at least the former option would allow the states to use
their public resources for their own purposes. I agree with Professor
Hoke that the extreme case of an unlimited federal power to place
more and more burdens on the states would absorb state revenues,
preoccupy state personnel, and, ultimately, crowd state and local initiatives off state agendas. She is also surely correct in contending that
a viable federalism requires more than that "States exist in some fashSprina 19941

67. See Steward Machine, 301 U.S. at 588.
68. Id. at 587.
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ion.",69 In a true federalism, the states have important autonomous
policy-making roles, so that participation in sub-national politics can
matter as to policy ends and the means chosen. Federal domination of
the political agendas of the states would be inconsistent with such a
true federalism. But so, too, would the extreme version of the allfederal alternative. The all-federal route allows the federal government to completely preempt the states from any field in which there is
a federal interest. Given today's integrated national-and rapidly
globalizing-economy and the frequency with which traditionally local problems now spill over state borders, there are few fields in which
there is no conceivable federal interest. Is the extreme case of a federally dominated state agenda really worse than the alternative extreme case of a succession of federal preemptions which result in no
state agenda at all?
Either extreme would be intolerable for the republican process
values Professor Hoke has located in federalism. The all-federal route
would be no more protective of federalism's values if Congress proceeded far enough down that route than would federal domination of
state agendas through the use of carrots and sticks. The question is
whether, under present conditions, Congress' use of mechanisms that
fall short of direct commands, but that induce or pressure the states to
participate in federal programs in a field-leaving open the option of
nonparticipation-is so clearly worse for the values of federalism than
total federal takeover that joint federal-state programs should have
constitutional limits.
This brings us back to health care reform. The states are sorely
stressed by the current costs of the health care system. Due to the
effects of interstate competition, limited state resources, and existing
federal programs, the states acting alone can neither cut costs nor extend coverage as effectively as they could with national assistance. An
all-federal program is both unlikely to be adopted and unlikely to provide any room for state discretion to meet local preferences and
needs. In this circumstance, a joint federal-state structure can serve
the needs of the states and their residents. Such a structure may require nation-wide coverage with concomitant restrictions on nonparticipating states to be effective, and may compel payments from every
state, including nonparticipating ones, to be fair. Such restrictions and
payment requirements may significantly influence the decisions of individual states concerning whether they will participate in such a program, but so long as the restrictions and requirements are reasonably
69. Hoke, supra note 1, at 546.
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related to the fairness and effectiveness of the national program and
as long as they avoid New York's proscription of direct commands, I
would find them worse for the states than either no federal action or a
total federal takeover of the field.
Indeed, instead of having an expansive reading of New York
shaping the design of health reform, perhaps the health reform example can affect our reading of New York. As health reform indicates,
federal-state relations are quite complex. The states are currently
hard pressed by serious and costly economic and social problems.
Often a principal restriction on state ability to address these problems
is a shortage of resources, the structural limitations of interstate competition, or existing federal statutes that address matters of federal
concern, rather than unfunded federal mandates. Federal programs
that address these limitations on state autonomy, including federal
programs that rely on the states to assume some administrative costs
and create incentives (or withdraw discretionary benefits) to secure
state participation, may be seen to empower the states even as they
press the states into the service of national objectives.
As a result, New York's command/inducement distinction will focus considerable attention on a program's substantive context: to the
benefits of the federal program to the states, to the costs of inaction,
and to the alternatives to the federal action said to place pressure on
the states. We must avoid abstract, semantic examination of the notions of "coercion" and permissible persuasion. Given our extensive
contemporary reliance on programs that combine federal financial or
regulatory benefits with federal conditions and requirements of the
states to address current domestic problems, and the likelihood that
Congress will continue to prefer such programs to all-federal action,
the burden ought to be on those who read New York expansively to
demonstrate that a joint federal-state program significantly interferes
with state autonomy, particularly if the likely result of barring a joint
federal-state program is no legislation to address the underlying economic or social problem at all. Until proven otherwise, our basic operating assumption has to be that half a loaf is better than none.

